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CLD-224        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1929 
 ___________ 
 
DWAYNE LARCEL BROWN, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
R. MARTINEZ, Warden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00384) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 30, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 5, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Dwayne Larcel Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  
For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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 Brown is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at 
Allenwood, Pennsylvania.  In 2004, he pled guilty to bank robbery in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida.  He was sentenced as a career offender 
to 170 months in prison, followed by supervised release.  His direct appeal was dismissed 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit based on an appeal waiver 
clause in his plea agreement.  Brown subsequently filed a motion to vacate, set aside or 
correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied.   
 Brown then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where 
he was imprisoned.  The petition was dismissed, and Brown did not appeal.  Brown 
returned to the Middle District of Florida, where he attempted to pursue various other 
post-judgment remedies.  When those were unsuccessful, he initiated the underlying 
proceedings by filing a second 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition.  In it he sought to raise a 
challenge to his sentence which had not previously been made.  Brown alleged that he 
was wrongly designated a career offender based on a clerical error in a state court 
judgment.  Specifically, he averred that in 1997, he was charged with second degree 
assault and battery, but pled guilty to the lesser offense of robbery and assault.  He stated 
that he informed trial counsel of this information during his federal sentencing 
proceeding but counsel took no action. 
 The District Court held that the relief Brown sought might be available to him via 
a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion filed in the district of sentencing.  See Okereke v. United 
States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002); Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 1165 
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(3d Cir. 1971).  However, since Brown had already filed such a motion, he would have to 
meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 in order to be able to file a second or 
successive § 2255 motion.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).  Brown readily admitted that he 
could not overcome this hurdle.  Because Brown could not demonstrate that § 2255 
provided an inadequate or ineffective remedy, the District Court dismissed his petition.  
See Galante, 437 F.2d at 1165.  Brown appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(a).  We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because this appeal 
presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6.  A motion 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the primary means to collaterally challenge a federal 
conviction or sentence.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1997).  We have 
held that the District Court may not consider claims properly brought under § 2255 in a 
§ 2241 habeas corpus petition unless § 2255 would provide an “inadequate or 
ineffective” means of relief.  See Galante, 437 F.2d at 1165.  Section 2255 is not 
inadequate or ineffective simply because Brown is prevented by the gatekeeping 
requirements of § 2255(h) from litigating his present claims.  See Cradle v. United States 
ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“It is the inefficacy of 
the remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative.”).  Furthermore, as 
the District Court noted, Brown must seek relief in the sentencing court -- in this case, the 
Middle District of Florida, and not in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  See Galante, 
437 F.2d at 1165. 
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 For all of these reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6. 
